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Abstract
Macroeconomics is in crisis and this creates openings for alternative
perspectives. The dominant heterodox traditions, however, have short-
comings that need to be addressed, both to improve our understanding
of the real world and to take advantage of the opportunities offered by
the irrelevance of most mainstream macro. This paper discusses three
examples of areas that need attention: (i) investment functions (where
popular specifications lack behavioral and empirical support), (ii) income
distribution (where key developments have received little attention) and
(iii) the relation between income inequality and financial markets (where
extensions of existing models may help explain financial instability).
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1 Introduction
Macroeconomics is in crisis and this creates openings for alternative perspec-
tives. The dominant heterodox traditions, however, have shortcomings that
need to be addressed, both to improve our understanding of the real world
and to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the irrelevance of most
mainstream macro. This paper discusses three areas that need attention: (i) in-
vestment functions (where popular specifications lack behavioral and empirical
support), (ii) income distribution (where key developments have received little
attention) and (iii) the relation between income inequality and financial markets
(where extensions of existing models may help explain financial instability).
First, the influential neo-Kaleckian specifications of investment behavior
treat the utilization rate of capital as an accommodating variable and assume
that accumulation is insensitive to variations in utilization. Empirically, this
assumption is at odds with the observed patterns which show fluctuations in
utilization around a fairly stable long-run level. The theoretical weakness of the
specification comes from the implausibility of the implied behavior of individual
firms. This theoretical critique points to a more general issue. Heterodox the-
ory rightly rejects the Lucas-style ‘microeconomic foundations’ of mainstream
macro, but this rejection must not lead to a neglect of microeconomic behavior:
our models need convincing behavioral stories.
Secondly, heterodox macroeconomics has traditionally focused on the func-
tional distribution of income. But the dramatic increase in inequality in the US
and other economies since the 1970s owes relatively little to changes in the profit
share, and an understanding of recent trends requires an extension of the analy-
sis. One element in this extension may come from the notion of ‘power-biased
technical change’.
Thirdly, finance has been at the center of the ‘great recession’, and main-
stream economists are scrambling to expand their models to include financial
elements. Heterodox theory has taken finance seriously, and the manifestations
and effects of ‘financialization’ (and neoliberalism, more generally) have been
analyzed in a large literature. The literature has stressed the reduction in ag-
gregate demand following an increase in the profit share, but other changes
may have been at least as important. Institutional changes have affected the
composition of asset demands, and the rising earnings inequality has also had
repercussions for financial markets and financial instability.
The structure of the paper follows the above outline. Section 2 discusses
investment behavior. Inequality is the focus of section 3, and section 4 looks at
financial issues. Section 5 contains a few concluding comments.
2 Investment functions and behavioral founda-
tions
The Lucas inspired research program has been a failure. The idea that a modern
macroeconomy should be analyzed through the lens of an infinitely-lived, utility
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maximizing representative household is bizarre, and the heterodox tradition
rightly insists on the importance of the institutional and structural features
of the economy. But the willingness in heterodox macro to consider different
specifications and ‘closures’ of the macro models can be taken too far.
Real capitalism is always specific and the cultural, institutional and histori-
cal context matters for economic behavior.1 But not all assumptions are equally
plausible. We may reject the ways in which mainstream macro has tried to build
microeconomic foundations, but that does not mean that behavioral consider-
ations are irrelevant for the development of good macroeconomic models. The
behavioral assumptions should be made explicit, and we should try to exclude
models based on implausible assumptions. The modeling of investment can be
used to illustrate this general argument.
In line with most post-Keynesian models, the ‘Kaleckian model’ ignores the
choice of technique and assumes that the production function has fixed coef-
ficients. Output is determined by aggregate demand, and all post-Keynesian
models agree that the short-run utilization rates depend on aggregate demand.
The Kaleckian model goes further, however. It extends the short-run variability
of utilization rates to the medium and long run. The model implies that perma-
nent shocks to aggregate demand - a change in saving rates, for instance - can
lead to permanent and quantitatively significant changes in utilization. Indeed
this is the key mechanism in the Kaleckian tradition that builds on Rowthorn
(1981), Dutt (1984) and Marglin and Bhaduri (1990). But is this long-run vari-
ability of the utilization rate empirically plausible? And is it consistent with a
reasonable story of goal-oriented behavior by firms?
The empirical question is best approached by noting how much variability is
implied by the standard ‘Keynesian stability condition’ that the models impose.
Consider a stripped-down Kaleckian model
S
K
= s(π)σu (1)
I
K
= γ0 + γ1u (2)
S
K
=
I
K
= g + δ (3)
where S, I,K are saving, investment and the capital stock, all in real terms; u is
the utilization rate of capital and σ the output-capital ratio at full utilization;
s(π) is the average saving rate which is typically taken to be an increasing
function of the profit share π; g is the equilibrium rate of accumulation and δ
the depreciation rate. Taking π as exogenous, the model can be solved for u and
1Katzner (2011), for instance, has stressed the differences between the US and the Japanese
— and Korean? — economies, and Henrich et al. (2004) found significant cross cultural differ-
ences in exprimental results for the ultimatum game.
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g,
u =
γ0
s(π)σ − γ1
(4)
g = γ0 + γ1
γ0
s(π)σ − γ1
− δ (5)
The ‘Keynesian stability condition’ requires that γ1 < s(π)σ. We have
good empirical evidence on the saving rate. Plausible values for the maximum
(annual) output-capital ratio σ fall in the region 0.3 − 1 and the gross saving
rate s(π) is about 0.2 in most OECD countries. Thus, the investment parameter
γ1, which in this model measures the long-run sensitivity of accumulation to
changes in the rate of utilization, must be below 0.06− 0.2. This restriction has
interesting implications. Using (4)-(5) it follows that
• shifts in the saving rate will generate a change in u that is at least 5-15
times larger than the change in the accumulation rate g :
∂g
∂s
= γ1
∂u
∂s
< s(π)σ
∂u
∂s
• the partial derivative of u with respect to s is given by
∂u
∂s
= u
−σ
s(π)σ − γ1
<
−u
s(π)
< 0
and even small shifts in s(π) have large effects on u.
• investment parameters that reduce the sensitivity of u to changes in the
saving rate will increase the ratio of the change in u to the change in g.
Thus, if one picks parameters that minimize the value of ∂u∂s (by setting
γ1 = 0), then the ratio of
∂u
∂s to
∂g
∂s goes to infinity.
These predictions simply do not fit the stylized facts. Figures 1a-b depicts
utilization and accumulation rates for US manufacturing industry. Both series
exhibit strong cyclical fluctuations as well as long-term movements. But the
long-term movements are of roughly the same magnitude: the trend rates of
both accumulation and utilization are about 2-4 percentage points lower towards
the end of the period.2
Industry-level evidence rejects the Kaleckian assumptions even more strongly.
The computer industry has seen average annual growth rates of about 20 per-
cent since the late 1960s while the iron and steel industry has declined, with
capacity that is about 15 percent lower in 2010 than it was in 1972 (figures 2a
and 3a). Yet both of these industries have utilization rates that fluctuate around
2This is in line with the econometric findings in Skott and Zipperer (2010).
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80 percent; in fact, the average rate of capacity utilization in the declining iron
and steel industry exceeds the average in the fast-growing computer industry
(figures 2b and 3b). These industry data contradict the Kaleckian specification
unless it is argued (quite reasonably) that the parameters in the accumulation
function are industry specific and (quite unreasonably) that these parameters
just happen to vary across industries in such a way that all industries end up
with roughly the same trend rates of utilization, despite huge differences in
growth rates.3
The behavioral/theoretical argument against the Kaleckian specification can
be phrased in terms of ‘stock-flow consistency’. The flow relation (2) for invest-
ment and the Kaleckian parameter restrictions are mathematically consistent
but the implied changes in the stock-flow ratio u are economically implausible:
goal-oriented firms will not behave in this manner. Suppose, for instance, that a
firm has seen its demand grow at the rate 10 percent. If γ0 = 0.12, γ1 = 0.1 and
δ = 0.1, the investment function gives a steady-state solution for the utilization
rate u = 0.8. Now suppose that the growth in demand drops to 5 percent. If
the investment function is unchanged, the firm will initially invest at a rate that
increases its capital stock at the old steady growth rate of 10 percent. As a
result, the utilization rate starts to fall and the firm will approach a new steady
growth path with u = 0.3. And had demand growth dropped another 3 per-
centage point to 0.2, the steady growth solution would have been u = 0! This
makes no sense. Assume, for concreteness, that firms are motivated exclusively
by profits.4 A profit-oriented firm only invests if the increase in the capital
stock raises expected future profits, and why invest in more machines if the firm
already has an abundance of unused capacity?
Heterodox macro correctly emphasizes that the presence of profound uncer-
tainty and animal spirits play an important role in investment decisions. But
one can accept the importance of uncertainty and animal spirits without aban-
doning the notion that firms are goal oriented and that investment decisions
must be understood in relation to these goals. There may not be a perfectly
well-defined ‘desired rate of utilization’, but the notion that firms will keep in-
vesting at a constant rate, even as utilization rates go to zero, fails the test of
behavioral plausibility.5
The Kaleckian model is admirably simple and has implications that may
seem desirable. But the investment function is theoretically and empirically im-
plausible, and the heterodox tradition offers several alternative specifications.6
3The construction of the utilization data raises a host of questions (e.g. Shapiro 1989).
Data problems can not, however, provide a convincing reconciliation of the evidence with the
Kaleckian specification.
4 Some post-Keynesians may want to broaden the objectives to include growth, for instance.
The precise objectives, however, make little difference to the general argument.
5The Kaleckian position has been defended by, among others, Dutt (1997), Lavoie (1995),
Dallery and van Treeck (2011); Skott (2012) discusses their arguments in greater detail.
6From a history-of-thought perspective the common identification of the Kaleckian speci-
fication with ‘post-Keynesian theory’ is surprising. Robinson, Kaldor and Steindl all rejected
the assumption of accommodating utilization rates in the long run, while Kalecki’s own com-
ments on this issue are open to several interpretations.
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In my view the most promising approach draws on Kaldorian, Harrodian and
Marxian theory (see Skott (1989) and Skott and Zipperer (2010)). Lagged re-
sponses and the distinction between short and long run effects are essential
in this approach, and this makes for models that are more complex than the
Kaleckian model. The benefits are a better empirical fit and a more convincing
behavioral story.
3 Income distribution
Most if not all strands of heterodox macro view the share of profits as an impor-
tant determinant of aggregate demand and economic performance. The details
differ, but the centrality of income distribution is common ground. This em-
phasis on distribution is surely warranted, but it may be a mistake to focus
narrowly on the functional distribution and there has been little attempt to
analyze the causes and effects of broader changes in earnings inequality.
The changes in earnings inequality are enormous. In the US the ‘great
compression’ in the 1940s saw earnings inequality plummet, but starting in the
late 1970s inequality has risen and is now at levels comparable to those in the
1920s: the income share of the top ten percent fell from about 45 percent in
the 1930s to about 32 percent in the period from the late 1940s to the early
1970s, and then rose to above 45 percent in 2008.7
The literature on neoliberalism and financialization has analyzed pressures
on the wage share.8 Outsourcing and the threat of outsourcing, for instance,
may have raised firms’ bargaining power, and workers have also been weakened
by the institutional changes in the labor market. In the US, the changes include
a decline in unionization and a fall in the minimum wage. These explanations
could — if suitably refined to explain the differential impact on different groups of
workers — account for the large rise in earnings inequality and the more modest
change in the functional distribution.
Explanations based on globalization and/or institutional change face an im-
portant objection, however: low-pay workers have been hurt in terms of both rel-
ative wage and relative employment. This positive correlation between changes
in relative employment and relative wages seems inconsistent with an institu-
tional explanation. Unless the technology has shifted, firms should have taken
advantage of the cheapening of low-pay labor and substituted low-pay workers
for the high-pay workers whose wages had increased. Mainstream explanations
of the rise in inequality therefore give a lot of weight to ‘skill biased technological
change’ (SBTC). SBTC operates on the demand side of the labor market, and
shifts in the relative demand for different types of workers can readily explain
why low-pay workers have suffered in terms of both employment and wages.9
7See the "Top incomes database" compiled by Alvaredo et al. (2011). This database also
shows that a great compression can be observed in other countries and that the recent increase
in inequality is widespread.
8E.g. Boyer 2000, Hein (2008), Crotty (2005), Palley (2007) and Epstein and Jayadev
(2007).
9 Skill-biases are not seen as the only influence on inequality. Globalization, international
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The SBTC hypothesis can be challenged on empirical grounds (e.g. Howell
(1999)) but my purpose here is different. I want to suggest that the heterodox
traditions provide natural starting points for an explanation of the observed
developments. They can shed light on some of the reasons for the institutional
changes that have been at least proximate causes of increasing inequality, and
they can challenge the TINA claim ("there is no alternative") that is used
implicitly or explicitly to support the skill-bias hypothesis.
SBTC affects the relative demand for different types of skill, but technical
change has another dimension: it can influence the power of different groups
of workers. Firms have the ability to dismiss and thereby hurt workers, and
this is a source of power for the firm. But workers can also affect outcomes
that matter for the firm, including profitability. All jobs entail some power in
this sense: an investment banker makes investments which may make or lose
millions for the bank, and a burger flipper can burn a few batches of burgers.
The difference in degree is important, partly because it influences the wage
that the firm will want to pay to help ensure that the worker will be acting
in the firm’s best interest. The wage will tend to be higher the larger are the
assets or operations that the worker controls and the weaker are the quality and
timeliness of the firm’s information about both the worker’s actions and the
situation in which the worker acts. These determinants of worker power will
depend on technology, and technological change is ‘power biased’ if it affects the
balance of power between firms and different groups of workers.
An advertisement from the "Parts Bin" in the Daily Hampshire Gazette (my
local newspaper in Amherst, MA), can be used as a simple illustration of the
argument. The ad shows a picture of a "Fleet Black Box" and explains how this
device gives the owner of a truck the ability to
monitor driver performance as it pertains to obeying the law, safety
and keeping operating costs in check (fuel economy, etc.) simply by
plugging the Road Safety RS-2000 Fleet Black Box into the OBD II
port of any 1996 and newer vehicle. You set the guidelines for high-
speed driving, hard cornering, hard breaking/acceleration and other
aggressive behaviors. According to the manufacturer, the RS-2000 is
tamper-proof and offers second-by-second reporting of vehicle speed,
G-Force, throttle position and even interior sound level.
As it says on the manufacturer’s webpage, "it is like being able to sit next to
every one of your drivers every second they drive".10
This technology marks a shift in the relationship between truck drivers and
owners. It used to be difficult for the owner of a truck to keep track of its
progress. The owner had no way to monitor continuously what happened en
route, and a late arrival at the destination could be blamed on mechanical
problems, bad weather or heavy traffic. The information problem also meant
that if the truck were to break down, it was difficult for the owner to tell whether
trade and institutional factors also get some weight in mainstream accounts.
10 http://www.roadsafety.com/fleet.php
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the breakdown had been caused by driver negligence. With the new technology,
this has all changed, and the balance of power has shifted against the drivers.11
Truck drivers are not unique. There is substantial evidence that the devel-
opment of computer-based information and communication technologies (ICTs)
has affected workers’ power, not least in growing industries such as retailing,
banking and telecommunications (e.g. Grimshaw et al. 2002; Miozzo and
Ramirez 2003; Hunter and Lafkas 2003). The new technologies do little to mon-
itor the more complex actions and options of high level executives, but large
groups of low-paid workers face increased monitoring and more precise task
specification. At the same time the new technologies have greatly enhanced the
flexibility of firms and their ability to coordinate complex production networks.
This is in contrast to the rigidity of earlier production systems which meant
that in 1937 workers at General Motors were able to bring a large part of the
operations of the company and many of its suppliers to a halt by sitting down
in a few factories.
Industrial conflict threatened the productivity gains of large-scale produc-
tion in the rigid production systems of the 1930s, and labor unions and govern-
ment regulation can be viewed as a way to alleviate these threats and promote
orderly industrial relations. Thus, the limitations of ICT facilitated the insti-
tutional changes that contributed to the great compression. Conversely, the
improvements in ICT from the 1970s led to increasing attacks on the institu-
tional framework that had been built up in the earlier phase.12
Some aspects of power-biased technological change (PBTC) can be formal-
ized using an efficiency-wage model, and it can be shown that PBTC can ac-
count for a simultaneous rise in the relative wage and the relative employment
of high-skill workers (Skott and Guy 2007). In other words, PBTC can explain
the particular employment-inequality pattern that has been regarded as a key
piece of evidence for the SBTC hypothesis. Unlike the SBTC hypothesis, more-
over, PBTC explains an increased intensity of work effort, evidence for which
is reviewed by Green (2004). In short, technological changes may have been
important for the movements in inequality, not because of skill bias but because
of their power bias: the changes have affected the ability of different groups to
extract rents.
The PBTC hypothesis suggests that technological factors facilitated the in-
stitutional changes that have weakened labor. As such, the hypothesis may
seem to offer little hope for a reversal of the changes through collective action
or policy intervention. Moreover, to the extent that intervention were to be suc-
11This line of argument is closely related to ideas that have been around in the Marxian
literature for a long time. Important contributions include, among others, Marglin (1974),
Braverman (1974), Green (1988) and Bowles (1989). Quoting Marx’s (1967, p. 436) statement
that "it would be possible to write quite a history of the inventions made since 1830, for the sole
purpose of supplying capital with weapons against the revolts of the working class", Bowles
goes on to describe how the pursuit of profit may lead capitalist firms to choose "capitalist
technologies" that are technically inefficient but enable firms to reduce wages and/ or enforce
an increase in the intensity of work. A similar argument is presented by Green (1988). See
also Auerbach (1988, p. 327).
12This argument is developed in greater detail in Guy and Skott (2008).
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cessful in reducing inequality, the PBTC hypothesis (like SBTC) would imply
costs in terms of increased unemployment. But perhaps we should not be too
pessimistic.
PBTC does not exclude other non-Walrasian elements, and there is ample
evidence that many workers fail to get jobs that make use of their qualifications.
This mismatch in the labor market means that policy initiatives that reverse the
increase in inequality need not increase unemployment, and may indeed cause
it to fall. A rise in the minimum wage, for instance, can have monopsonistic
effects: low-wage workers may gain both in terms of wages and employment,
and aggregate unemployment may fall (Slonimczyk and Skott 2010). Thus, in
the US, the decline in the minimum wage since the late 1970s is consistent with
the observed patterns in inequality and relative employment.
In my view there is considerable evidence to support both the PBTC hy-
pothesis and the mismatch argument, and the two theories are not mutually
exclusive. In fact, other influences may also have contributed to rising inequal-
ity, including skill biases and globalization effects. My purpose here is not to
propose a definitive explanation but merely to argue that the movements in
earnings inequality demand attention and that the heterodox traditions offer
promising insights. This field should not be left to mainstream economics.
4 Financial assets and financial instability
Heterodox models typically assume that the saving rate out of profits exceeds
that out of wage income. This assumption has empirical support, and Kaldor
(1966) provided an important theoretical argument for differential saving rates.13
In a corporate economy, household wealth consists of financial assets, and finan-
cial markets and the distinction between financial and real assets are central to
Kaldor’s argument.14
Consider an economy where households hold their wealth in two financial
assets, bank deposits and shares. For simplicity, assume that the desired wealth
holdings are proportional to income
vN = αpY (6)
M = βpY (7)
where v is the price of shares, N the number of shares and M the amount of
deposits. The parameters α and β may depend on the expected returns, but in
a simple benchmark version of the model they can be taken as constants.
Households receive wage income W , interest income iM, and dividends D.
If firms retain a fraction sf of their profits, the dividends can be written
D = (1− sf )Π (8)
13Kaldor named his result a ‘neo-Pasinetti’ theorem since supposedly it supported the po-
sition held by Pasinetti in a debate with Samuelson and Modigliani. The name is misleading
since Pasinetti based his argument on very different grounds.
14Kaldor’s original presentation had weaknesses and the presentation here follows Skott
(1981).
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where Π is the level of profits.
The flow of income is (i) spent on consumption, (ii) spent on buying new
shares or (iii) added to bank deposits (households do not hold any cash). Thus,
we can write households’ budget constraint as
W + (1− sf )Π+ iM = pC + M˙ + vN˙ (9)
where a dot over a variable denotes the rate of change, i.e. x˙ = dx/dt. Using
(6) and (7),
pC = W + (1− sf )Π+ (i−
M˙
M
)M − vN N˙
N
= pY − sfπpY + (i− Mˆ)βpY − αpY Nˆ
= pY [1− sfπ + β(r − Yˆ )− αNˆ ] (10)
where π is the profit share, ‘hats’ denote growth rates (xˆ = (dx/dt)/x), r = i− pˆ
is the real rate of interest, and where the last equation uses Mˆ = pˆ+ Yˆ (which
follows from equation (7)).
The saving rate can now be found as
S
Y
= 1− pC
pY
= sfπ + αNˆ − β(r − Yˆ ) (11)
Thus, the saving rate depends positively on the profit share. Note in particular
that there is no heterogeneity among households in this model. It is not a case of
"an identifiable class of hereditary barons — a class of capitalists ‘with permanent
membership’ — distinguished by a high saving propensity and of a ‘permanent’
class of workers distinguished by a low saving propensity". Instead, the high
saving propensity out of profits is "something which attaches to the nature of
business income and not the wealth (or other peculiarities) of the individuals
who own property" (Kaldor 1966, p. 310).
The ‘neo-Pasinetti’ result is strange from the perspective of mainstream
theories. Firms are owned by households, and firms’ financial decisions are
not seen as a determinant of aggregate saving. In fact under the (restrictive)
conditions of the celebrated Modigliani-Miller theorem, the financial policies of
a firm are of no concern to its owners. If the firm chooses to finance investment
through retained earnings, the value of the firm’s shares will increase and its
owners can ‘declare their own dividends’ by selling off some of their shares. The
result is exactly the same as if the firm had paid dividends and financed the
investment through the issue of new shares.15 Kaldor’s argument shows that
15Bliss’s (1975) critique of the ‘Cambridge model’ expresses this point clearly:
in the semi-stationary state, it is households that ‘call the tune’ when it comes
to saving, not because only households can save, but because when firms save
(retain earnings for investment) the ownership rights in those firms appreciate
in value along with the new investment and so increase the net worth of the
households that share in the ownership of the firms, and hence increase their
ability to consume if they so wish. (p. 135)
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this micro analysis does not apply at the macro level. If the corporate sector
as a whole increases the retention rate sf , households may respond by trying to
declare their own dividends. But there will be no buyers if all households try to
sell shares. Thus, the share prices will simply drop and the resulting capital loss
will reduce households’ desired consumption. In short, retention policies affect
aggregate saving.
The growth in the number of shares, Nˆ , is determined by firms’ new issue
policies and empirically Nˆ is close to zero, on average. Since the terms r−Yˆ and
β both tend to be small, too, a specification in which S/Y depends exclusively
on the profit share may be a reasonable approximation for many purposes. This
special case, which is used in many heterodox models, simplifies the analysis,
and the simplification may be harmless for many purposes. Simple benchmark
cases can also be misleading, however. Financial practices are not constant, and
Minsky (among others) suggested that endogenous changes in financial behavior
— e.g α, β, Nˆ , sf — can be a source of instability.
Most Minsky models have focused on gradual changes in the fragility of
firms’ balance sheets, as periods of tranquility lead firms to rely increasingly
on external finance. In terms of the specification here, this route corresponds
to changes in Nˆ and sf for any given value of I/Y. But household behavior
can also be a source of Minskian dynamics.16 The portfolio parameters α and
β need not be constant. The desired portfolio composition is likely to depend
on expected returns, and expected future returns are influenced by current and
past returns. The returns on equity include capital gains, and this introduces
a positive (destabilizing) feedback mechanism: an increase in the demand for
stocks generates capital gains and these capital gains induce further shifts of
the desired portfolio composition towards equity.
One implication of this general line of argument is the possibility of inequality-
induced financial instability. The simple neo-Pasinetti model treats the house-
hold sector as homogeneous. Households, however, differ substantially with
respect to both their saving rates and portfolio composition. The Survey of
Consumer Finances shows — not surprisingly — that low and middle income
groups have few financial assets. Their wealth-income ratio is lower than that
of the rich, and the composition of their portfolio is different. Housing makes
up a larger fraction, and their holdings of financial assets are skewed towards
fixed income assets. The rich, by contrast, hold a disproportionate amount of
their wealth in stocks. Thus, in 2001 stockholding households had average net
worth that was 3-4 times higher than that of non-stockholding households, and
the mean and median share of stocks in financial assets was 9.2 and 0.0, respec-
tively, for households with a head of household aged between 55 and 64 and net
worth between $10,000 and $100,000, but 31.5 and 30.5 percent for households
with net worth above $1 million ((Curcuru et al. (2005, Tables 4 and 6)).
These patterns suggest that an increase in inequality will raise the demand
for stocks. With a given supply of stocks, the result is a rising stock market,
16Models that focus mainly on firms include Delli Gati and Gallegati (1990) and Skott
(1994); Palley (1994) emphasizes household behavior; Ryoo (2010) includes changes in the
financial practices of both firms and households.
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and the general Minskian argument now kicks in. As returns rise — boosted by
capital gains — the desired portfolios shift further towards stocks, and the result
may be the emergence of a financial bubble. The interactions are quite complex
- despite the straightforward intuition - but the potential for an increase in
inequality to induce financial instability can be confirmed using a simple formal
model (Skott 2011)17.
Variations in portfolio shares are central to this story of inequality-induced
bubbles, and portfolio shares do exhibit considerable variation over time (see
figure 4), but many other factors influence the average portfolio composition.
Indeed, the income-distribution argument relies on the more general observa-
tion that relative asset demands depend on the composition and conditions of
households. Thus, the same type of argument would suggest that other struc-
tural features will affect average portfolio decisions — demographic changes is
an obvious source as are pension reforms or tax changes — and the destabilizing
feedback effects from capital gains to portfolio shifts does not depend of the
specific initial shock.
It should be emphasized, finally, that although the portfolio argument pro-
vides a mechanism through which changes in the earnings distribution may have
contributed to the stock market bubble in the 1990s, it clearly provides — at best
— one element for an understanding of financial instability and of the possible
links between inequality and instability.18 Moreover, the argument has little to
say about the housing bubble in the 2000s.19 Thus, the purpose of this sec-
tion is not to provide an account of recent events. The purpose is much more
limited: to illustrate how existing elements within the heterodox tradition can
form a platform for a fruitful analysis of the interaction between financial and
real forces.
5 Conclusions
Keynes and ‘old Keynesians’ like Tobin and Solow were keenly aware that good
macroeconomics requires an understanding of the behavior of individual firms
and households. But they also knew that the step from micro to macro is
complicated, both because of technical aggregation issues — which mean that
the aggregate behavior cannot be derived from the optimization of an invari-
ant representative agent — and because the behavior of the micro units may
itself be strongly influenced by the macro environment in which they operate.
The financial instability argument in section 4 includes both types of complica-
17The benchmark stock-flow relations in (6)-(7) are best thought of as long-run targets.
Aside from having relative returns influence the targets, the model therefore uses a specifica-
tion with gradual adjustments towards the target ratios.
18Wisman and Baker (2011) discusses several other possible links between inequality and
instability. See also Kotz (2010), Palley (2010) and Wolff (2010).
19 Inequality may be relevant for the housing bubble too but the mechanism is different.
The willingness of low and mid income households to go into debt may be explained in part
by their attempt to maintain consumption standards and/or keep up with their neightbours
and other reference groups, despite falling incomes.
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tions. Changes in income distribution, first, affects the average portfolio and
thereby the properties of the ‘representative agent’, and households, second, do
not ‘know the model’ and cannot form rational expectations. They operate in
an uncertain macro environment that is undergoing constant change, and the
portfolio decisions are based on adaptive changes in their perceptions of this
environment and the relative returns that it may generate.
The old Keynesian tradition has fallen out of favor. Following the Lucas
critique mainstream, macroeconomics abandoned the old Keynesian approach
in favor of ‘micro founded’ models based on the explicit optimization by repre-
sentative agents. The heterodox tradition, meanwhile, has undergone its own
bifurcation. Some branches of heterodox macro seem to emphasize the structural
and macro constraints to such an extent that micro behavior is almost forgotten;
other branches want to build up the macro economy from the emergent proper-
ties of an agent-based system. Undoubtedly these three different approaches can
each produce valuable insights. Optimizing representative-agent models may be
relevant for some questions, purely structuralist analyses of macro systems can
highlight important interactions and system constraints, and computer-based
methods allow us to examine interactions of a complexity that defy traditional
techniques.
Methodologically, however, I think Keynes and the old Keynesians got it
about right.20 The financial instability argument illustrates the limitations of
the mainstream representative agent while, on the other hand, the Kaleckian
investment theory fails to consider the microeconomic plausibility of the as-
sumed parameter restrictions. We want an integrated story about goal-oriented
microeconomic behavior in a specific historical and institutional context and an
eclectic approach is needed to achieve this. Simple mechanical prescriptions (like
‘you must always base your macro model on explicit and well-specified utility
functions’) are not helpful, and we do not want to exclude particular research
tools, be it formal mathematical or statistical techniques, computer simulations,
case studies or historical analysis. We need all the tools we can get, but the use
of the tools requires sound judgment, and unfortunately it is hard to pin down
exactly what that means.
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a: Level and growth of capacity
.
b: Utilization rate
Figure 1:. Industrial capacity and utilization in US Manufacturing; Stan-
dard Industrial Classification; seasonally adjusted. Data source: Federal Re-
serve (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/).
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Figure 2: Industrial capacity and utilization in "Computers, communica-
tions eq., and semiconductors" (NAICS = 3341,3342,334412-9); s.a. Data source:
Federal Reserve (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/).
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Figure 3: Industrial capacity and utilization in "Iron and steel products"
(NAICS = 3311,2); s.a. Data source: Federal Reserve (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/).
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Figure 4: Shares of equity in financial net worth; US households and non-
profit organizations (source: Federal Reserve Board,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/data.htm, Table B.100)
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